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Systems biology, synthetic biology and data-driven research: a commentary 
on Krohs, Callebaut, and O’Malley and Soyer 
 
Jane Calvert 
 
Published as: Calvert, J (2012) ‘Systems biology, synthetic biology and data-driven research: a 
commentary on Krohs, Callebaut, and O’Malley and Soyer’ Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (1): 81–84. 
 
The three papers that I will discuss here all focus on systems biology. This is 
significant in the context of data-driven research, because systems biology is the 
approach to biology which explicitly attempts to make sense of the vast amounts of 
‘omics’ data generated by high-throughput techniques. Two of the three papers 
(Callebaut and O’Malley and Soyer) additionally address synthetic biology. Systems 
and synthetic biology have much in common, and both can be interpreted as 
attempts to deliver on the promises of the genome sequencing projects, in respect 
to both biological understanding and applications (Calvert and Fujimura, 2011). The 
two fields do have important differences in their orientation and aims, however, and 
I will return to this point in my discussion of engineering below. 
 
The three papers came out of a workshop on ‘Data-driven research in the biological 
and biomedical sciences’. The workshop was motivated by questions such as: Is data-
driven research leading to changes in the ways in which biology is done? How should 
we understand these changes? What epistemological issues do they raise? Where do 
they leave hypothesis-driven research? And how do these developments challenge 
current thinking in the philosophy, history and sociology of science? As I understood 
it, the overarching aim of the workshop was to attempt to “come to grips 
philosophically with the transformations of biology in this century” (Callebaut p.14). 
 
My aim in this discussion paper is to start a conversation between the three papers. 
And something immediately notable about all of them is that they introduce new (or 
relatively new) concepts, such as convenience experimentation (Krohs), exploratory 
questioning (O’Malley and Soyer), scientific perspectivism (Callebaut), and 
integration (O’Malley and Soyer). This introduction of new concepts suggests that we 
are seeing changes in the way in which biology is done that we currently do not have 
the conceptual tools to grasp. These papers seek to provide us with new tools to 
think with, to give us a better understanding of emerging biological practices. All the 
papers also contain (either implicitly or explicitly) the view that categorising 
biological research as either hypothesis-driven or data-driven is not satisfactory, and 
that explaining current developments in terms of a shift toward data-driven research 
somehow does not capture everything we want to explain. 
 
I start by discussing Krohs’ argument about the over-reliance by top-down systems 
biology on convenience experimentation. This paper demonstrates the importance 
of technological developments and how they influence what comes to be known. I 
then compare Krohs’ discussion of exploratory experimentation with O’Malley and 
Soyer’s notion of exploratory questioning, and I go on to look at the other epistemic 
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features of systems biology highlighted by O’Malley and Soyer, focusing particularly 
on integration, which I think is a crucially important concept. I connect their 
discussion of integration to some of my own empirical work on interdisciplinarity in 
systems biology. I argue that Callebaut’s scientific perspectivism has similarities to 
the integration discussed by O’Malley and Soyer. I then reflect on one strand of 
Callebaut’s article, dealing with synthetic biology, to put forward some ideas about 
the importance of taking engineering seriously in the social and philosophical studies 
of the life sciences. 
 
Krohs on convenience experimentation 
Krohs’ paper argues that there is a strong reliance on what he calls convenience 
experimentation in top-down systems biology, a branch of systems biology that 
studies ‘omic’ interactions at the whole cell scale. (As Krohs himself points out, top-
down systems biology is only one strand of systems biology). Krohs summarizes his 
argument: “in convenience experimentation many experiments are done in the way 
they are actually done for the reason that they are so extraordinary convenient to 
perform” (p.13). He says that convenience experimentation has developed in a 
context where data has become extremely plentiful, and argues it is convenience 
experimentation, rather than hypotheses, that drives model building in top-down 
systems biology. This has important implications, because practicing science in such 
a manner “strongly channels research” (p.3). To use a familiar analogy, like a drunk 
who looks for his lost keys under the lamp-post, because that is where the light is, 
Krohs’ argument is that scientists do certain experiments simply because they have 
the technologies available (such as microarrays, for example). This type of 
experimentation carries low epistemic risk, as illustrated by a different analogy Krohs 
uses in a footnote: “The situation resembles industrial prefabrication of meals, 
convenience food, which simplifies home cooking – and standardizes its outcome” 
(p.3). 
 
Krohs elucidates the nature of convenience experimentation by drawing a 
comparison between metabolic pathway analysis and top-down systems biology. In 
an earlier paper he explains that top-down systems biology is concerned with the 
topology of a network “without further characterizing the components in any other 
way than by describing their place within the network (as a “node” of the network) 
and the interactions they are engaged in (“edges” in the terminology of network 
analysis)” (Krohs 2010, p. 154-155). He explains that while metabolic pathway 
analysis assumes a ‘general explanatory hypothesis of localisation’, where each 
reaction has an identifiable role in a metabolic pathway, top-down systems biology 
adopts a ‘general explanatory hypothesis of delocalization’ where enzymes do not 
have stable roles, but are simply regarded as nodes in a broader network, meaning 
that regulatory functions are assumed to be delocalized. He argues that the 
methodology of convenience experimentation in top-down systems biology will only 
produce datasets that satisfy “the preconception of delocalized functionality” (p.11). 
The tools and models adopted strongly influence the conclusions that can be drawn. 
 
He also maintains that the kind of datasets used in top-down systems biology have 
led to a change in modelling strategies towards Boolean networks, “and 
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consequently to a change in the epistemic goals that can be followed” (Krohs p.8). 
This profound epistemic shift in the way that science is done is what is particularly 
interesting about Krohs’ analysis of convenience experimentation. He says we are 
seeing dramatic changes in biological theorizing which “follow in a clandestine 
manner” (Krohs p.3) from convenience experimentation. 
 
The situation is different with data-mining, however, which, it could be argued, is an 
important part of systems biology. Krohs says “when data mining is also taken into 
consideration, convenience experimentation based research becomes exploratory” 
(p.11). The word ‘exploratory’ is important here, because Krohs distinguishes 
between three types of experimentation: convenience experimentation, hypothesis-
driven experimentation, and exploratory experimentation (drawing on Burian 1997 
and Steinle 1997). He describes exploratory experimentation as the kind of research 
that requires “uncertainty about the conceptual framing of the experiment, its 
relevance, or even about the very phenomenon to be investigated” (p.13). 
Experimentation is exploratory only when the researcher does not know what they 
are going to find out. If Krohs’ arguments hold, this is clearly not the case with 
convenience experimentation. 
 
O’Malley and Soyer on integration 
I think a helpful way of understanding Krohs notion of exploratory experimentation 
is by linking it to O’Malley and Soyer’s discussion of ‘exploratory questions’. They 
describe these as being broad general questions rather than specific hypotheses. 
O’Malley and Soyer give some examples of these, including ‘what if’ questions (p.17), 
and questions like ‘what’s going on here, and what happens when we construct 
things differently?’ (p.21). 
 
According to O’Malley and Soyer, exploratory questioning is only one element of 
integration, and integration is the most important analytical category in their paper. 
They divide integration into three components: exploratory questioning, 
technological development and the transfer of explanations from one research 
domain to another. They argue convincingly that these factors are of more 
importance in understanding scientific change than an emphasis on data-driven or 
hypothesis-driven approaches. In fact, they suggest that we should break away from 
the classification of research as either hypothesis- or data-driven towards 
understanding science in terms of a more inclusive range of practices. This 
perspective is refreshing, and also demonstrates the need to rethink our existing 
conceptual categories in the light of developments in the life sciences. 
 
They describe integration as combining different datasets, methods, and 
approaches. They describe disciplinary integration as one of the conditions for 
integration, but I think we could see it as a form of integration itself, since systems 
biology requires that physicists, computer scientists, engineers, mathematicians, 
statisticians and biologists come together in new interdisciplinary configurations. The 
advantage of using ‘integration’ in this broader sense is that it works at many 
different levels: theoretical, methodological and social. 
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If we think of disciplinary integration as a form of integration, empirical work 
becomes relevant. O’Malley and Soyer note that for many biologists “optimal 
individuals are those who have trained in one discipline and learned to work with 
other disciplines” adding “Monodisciplinary training is still considered to be the best 
way to avoid the production of undertrained but multidisciplinary researchers” 
(p.28). My qualitative empirical study of 35 systems biologists shows there is not a 
consensus amongst people working in systems biology that monodisciplinary training 
is preferred, however, but there are a range of views about how future systems 
biologists should be educated (Calvert 2010). For example, some systems biologists 
think radical changes in science education are necessary, reaching down to 
undergraduate or even high school level, while other senior systems biologists argue 
that in the future all scientists should have a dual major. In one doctoral training 
centre for systems biology in the UK graduate students are trained to develop a 
specific area of expertise, but also to have the ability to talk across disciplines. In this 
way they develop a ‘light’ expertise in a discipline outside their own. Others hope 
the interdisciplinary training of undergraduates and postgraduates means that we 
will see a movement from specialists to ‘integrators’ in the future. 
 
A distinction can also be made between collaborative interdisciplinarity (where 
individuals come together from different disciplines to work on a problem), and 
individual interdisciplinarity (where multiple disciplinary skills are found within one 
individual). Although, as O’Malley and Soyer point out, some commentators doubt 
the value of the latter, for others, training multi-skilled systems biologists is the long-
term aim. This is currently more of an aspiration than a reality at the moment, 
although in some cases we are starting to see the ‘wet’ (lab) and ‘dry’ 
(computational) distinction breaking down, with some systems biologists starting to 
talk about being “moist” and even “soggy” and “damp” researchers, depending on 
the type of research they are doing (Calvert 2010). 
 
It is not easy to introduce changes in the way scientists are trained, however, 
because these changes have the potential to destabilise existing disciplines and 
practices.
1
 This destabilization may explain why systems biologists often face 
institutional resistance when setting up centres and institutes dedicated to systems 
biology. And once these institutes are set up, tensions will often arise because of 
competing ideas about what systems biology should achieve, and different attitudes 
towards quantification and predictability (see Calvert and Fujimura 2011). 
 
These are small additions to O’Malley and Soyer’s brief comments on 
interdisciplinarity in systems biology, and my aim in making these comments is to 
show that it may be useful to adopt a broader understanding of integration. In fact, 
such an understanding of integration has significance beyond the philosophy of 
systems biology. For example, the US’s National Research Council’s 2009 report A 
New Biology for the 21st Century argues “the essence of the New Biology is 
integration – re-integration of the many subdisciplines of biology, and the 
integration into biology of physicists, chemists, computer scientists, engineers, and 
                                                 
1
 This is an example of what Barry et al. (2008) call the ‘agonistic-antagonistic’ mode of 
interdisciplinarity. 
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mathematicians” (p.vii). Integration is starting to become an important analytical 
category not only in epistemic, methodological and social contexts, but also at the 
level of science policy. 
 
To add a final further dimension, the interdisciplinary integration we see in fields like 
systems and synthetic biology may extend even further than the natural and physical 
sciences to incorporate the social sciences and humanities. Although some might 
assume that this would be a difficult stretch, the paper by O’Malley and Soyer is 
itself an excellent example of a collaboration between a philosopher and a systems 
biologist.  This broader understanding of ‘integration’ connects to Fisher et al.’s 
(2006) use of the term to refer to the integration of perspectives from the social 
sciences and the humanities into science and engineering. It also ties into a point 
Callebaut makes in a footnote, that philosophers should not merely be running 
behind the scientists uncritically, but, as Francisco Varela puts it, “helping us by 
suggesting some wild ideas” (p.4). 
 
Callebaut on scientific perspectivism 
The key concept in Callebaut’s paper on big-data biology is scientific perspectivism.
2
 
This is an idea I cannot do justice to here, but crudely put it is a philosophical 
position that recognises that we always perceive the world from a particular point of 
view because of factors such as our observational vantage point, our theoretical 
position, and even the language that we speak. Scientific perspectivism leads to the 
conclusion that reality itself is “multi-perspectival” (Callebaut p.18), and it is not 
possible to reduce these perspectives to a single meaning.
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 In other words, there is 
no ‘God’s eye view’. 
 
Callebaut makes the interesting suggestion that complex systems are more likely 
than simple systems to “require the use of information from more than one 
perspective for their solution” (p.18). This implies that data-driven research, and 
systems biology in particular, will demand the integration of multiple perspectives. 
And systems biologists support this point when they argue that it is the complexity of 
the object (the biological system) that makes interdisciplinary collaboration a 
necessity in their field. The assumption that the more complex the object the 
broader the range of expertise required is what Mattila (2005) calls ‘object oriented 
interdisciplinarity’, where new objects of study lead to new interdisciplinary 
arrangements.  
 
As will have probably already become apparent, Callebaut’s discussion of scientific 
perspectivism has very interesting resonances with O’Malley and Soyer’s discussion 
of integration. The interdisciplinarity which is a condition for both is highlighted by 
Callebaut when he says “biocomplexity research may require collaborations among 
disciplines as disparate as oceanography and epidemiology” (p.21).  
 
                                                 
2
 Callebaut draws on Giere (2006) here, but also Wimsatt (2007) and Van Fraasen (2008), among 
others. 
3
 As a sociologist, I see links between scientific perspectivism and Haraway’s (1988) idea of situated 
knowledges. 
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Another feature Callebaut argues is important to scientific perspectivism is that it 
“should also fully take into account the collective, distributed nature of scientific 
cognition” (Callebaut p.22). This connects to the idea of collaborative 
interdisciplinarity discussed above. With collaborative interdisciplinarity one person 
does not need to have all the expertise necessary to deal with the diverse datasets 
and approaches being brought to bear in systems biology; instead this expertise is 
spread over interdisciplinary teams of researchers. We could argue that where 
multiple complex datasets are the focus we are likely to see a form of distributed 
cognition, where knowledge is shared amongst a heterogeneous scientific 
community. 
 
Engineering life 
Scientific perspectivism is the central concept in Callebaut’s paper, but another 
important strand of the paper is exhibited in the idea of ‘engineering life’ as 
‘changing the living world without trying to understand it’. This is a view that 
Callebaut draws from Woese’s (2004) famous article ‘A new biology for a new 
century’, where Woese laments about the current lack of a ‘guiding vision’ for the 
life sciences, saying that without such a vision science becomes an engineering 
discipline. This requires further analysis because neither Callebaut nor Woese 
explain what is meant by engineering. In fact, as Callebaut admits, he does not talk 
directly about what it means to engineer life, or about the aspiration to change the 
living world without trying to understand it.  
 
Both Woese and Callebaut seem to be using ‘engineering’ as a placeholder for trends 
in the life sciences they are concerned about. However, most discussions of 
engineering do not describe it as being data-driven. Woese equates engineering with 
technological advance, but this characterisation overlooks distinctive features of 
engineering. Similarly, engineering may be mechanistic and reductionistic, as both 
Woese and Callebaut imply, but reductionism is not the motivation behind 
engineering.  
 
I think that the nature of engineering is a very interesting topic that deserves further 
investigation by philosophers, sociologists and historians of science (particularly 
those who are interested in synthetic biology). Work has already been done on this 
topic of course, and one of the most well-known contributors is Vincenti (1990), who 
describes engineering as “the practice of organizing the design and construction of 
any artifice which transforms the physical world around us to meet some recognized 
need” (p.6). Rather than being focused on technology development or data 
accumulation, in engineering the emphasis is on meeting recognised needs. In this 
sense, knowledge is a means to a certain end (not an end in itself) for engineers. 
Vincenti even says “Engineering can, in fact, be defined in terms of these ends” (p.6).  
 
This instrumentalism might itself explain why engineering seems to jar with thinkers 
like Woese and Callebaut. Woese characterises science as “an endless search for 
truth”, and I would agree that this is certainly not the aim of engineering, but this is 
because engineering is different from science. The instrumentalism of engineering, 
and the assumed superiority of ‘head’ over ‘hand’ might also explain why 
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engineering is a topic that has been neglected by the philosophy of science, which is 
particularly concerned with the acquisition of knowledge. The aim of engineering is 
not to increase our understanding of the world, but to change it (to paraphrase 
Marx). It is not a criticism of engineering to say that it is instrumental, because the 
whole point of engineering is to put scientific knowledge to practical uses. 
 
I think a study of synthetic biology, in particular, benefits from taking engineering 
seriously; not condemning it for not furthering the pursuit of knowledge, but 
recognising that it has different aims. Keller (2009) acknowledges this, but argues 
that since the guiding aim of synthetic biology is not to find out about the natural 
world, it should not be called ‘biology’, a point that Woese and Callebaut might 
agree with. 
 
If we understand synthetic biology as a branch of engineering, as some of its 
proponents maintain, then it becomes hard to put synthetic biology under the broad 
heading of data-driven research. Synthetic biology may have been one of the 
disciplines that emerged in the wake of the data generated by the genome projects, 
but the aim of the field is to make biological devices that perform desired functions. 
Synthetic biologists, unlike other post-genomic scientists, do not talk about drowning 
in data; they talk about not being able to get their constructions to work. 
 
I recognise that not all of those who do research under the heading of ‘synthetic 
biology’ see their work as a branch of engineering, and in my depiction of synthetic 
biology here I am drawing primarily on the parts-based approaches (see for example 
Heinmann and Panke 2006; Endy 2005; Adrianantanandro et al. 2006; Brent 2004). I 
also recognise that much that goes on under the heading of ‘synthetic biology’ aims 
to increase our understanding of biological systems. Some fascinating examples of 
this type of synthetic biology are given by O’Malley and Soyer in their discussion of 
noise biology. But I do think the engineering approach to biology has novel 
conceptual consequences, which deserve further investigation in their own right. For 
example, one of the features of engineering that is much discussed in engineering-
oriented branches of synthetic biology is the engineering design cycle (Royal 
Academy of Engineering 2009), and this has many interesting similarities to the 
iterativity discussed by O’Malley and Soyer. 
 
Conclusions: new ways of thinking about scientific practice 
All three of the papers discussed here started from an interest in the 
transformations in biology that are associated with data-driven research, particularly 
those manifested by systems biology. Something which underlies all the papers is 
the importance of technological changes in driving scientific research. All the papers 
show how technological developments can result in conceptual ones, although Krohs 
and Callebaut are rather concerned about the results of these developments, while 
O’Malley and Soyer are more optimistic.
4
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 O’Malley and Soyer give examples of how technological developments, such as flow cytometry, have 
given rise to new biological topics, such as noise biology. 
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The papers have all provided us with new conceptual tools to help understand the 
changes we are witnessing in the life sciences; tools that will not only be useful for 
commentators on science such as philosophers, historians and sociologists, but also 
for scientists themselves. These conceptual tools have arisen out of a sensitivity to 
the changing nature of the life sciences, which means they are likely to be refined 
and modified as the science itself changes and develops. 
 
Krohs explains how convenience experimentation, enabled by high-throughput data 
gathering methods, can lead to shifts in epistemic goals and in biological theorizing. 
O’Malley and Soyer’s notion of integration elucidates current research practices, 
and, I have argued, could be expanded to encompass social and perhaps even policy 
dimensions of systems biology. Callebaut’s scientific perspectivism shows how 
complex systems may require a broader range of perspectives than simpler ones, 
and points to the importance of distributed cognition in heterogeneous scientific 
communities. And I have suggested we add serious consideration of the nature of 
engineering to our theoretical repertoire.  
 
What is most important in all three of these stimulating papers, however, is that 
“new ways of thinking about scientific practice are emerging” (O’Malley and Soyer 
p.30). It is clear that the categories of data-driven and hypothesis-driven research do 
not capture everything we want to explain when thinking about current biology, and 
that the concepts introduced in these papers will have an important role to play in 
future work. 
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